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Abstract: George Orwell, anticipating many of the arguments made by Benedict 
Anderson in the „Patriotism and Racism‟ chapter of Imagined Communities, 
illuminated patriotism and nationalism as shifting aspects of a wider dialectical 
interplay between an identification with imagined communities and a loyalty to 
humanity. Orwell‟s essay “Inside the Whale” can be seen, contrary to Salman 
Rushdie‟s criticism that it advocates quietism, as an essay about imaginary 
homelands. In this reading the whale is a metaphor for a dialectical space created by a 
writer in order to gain purchase on the unceasing dialectic of history. Analysis of The 
Lion and the Unicorn in this article links Orwell‟s work with that of Anderson and 
Rushdie by exploring in his vision of a classless England the relationship between the 
personal imaginary homeland and the political imagined community. 
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In The Lion and the Unicorn (1941), George Orwell argues that the patriotism of the 
common people is neither jingoistic nor militaristic, as exemplified by the fact that the 
most celebrated poems, such as Charles Wolfe‟s “The Burial of Sir John Moore after 
Corunna”, are about defeats. Five verses of Wolfe‟s poem are quoted by Benedict 
Anderson in Imagined Communities in order to illustrate how the imagined 
community of the English is both open to others through its shared learnable language 
– Moore and Wolfe were Irish – and closed by its relationship to “historical fatality” 
(146). That is, the English dead, rather than being left to bury themselves, are 
constantly invoked as shadowy presences who serve to define an England that cannot 
be changed because it is historically fixed. According to Anderson, this is not to rule 
out the possibility of naturalisation but to ensure that English identity is fixed in such 
a way that newcomers can never change it. 
   “Patriotism and Racism” is the chapter of Imagined Communities in which this is 
discussed, although the text is actually contrasting nationalism with racism. The effect 
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of this in a book specifically about nationalism is to associate patriotism with racism. 
Thus the openness of the “imagined community” and the positive value of self-
sacrificial love is equated with nationalism; while the closed nature of the traditional 
community is equated with patriotism and racism: “The fact of the matter is that 
nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies, while racism dreams of eternal 
contaminations, transmitted from the origins of time through an endless sequence of 
loathsome copulations: outside history” (149). Racism is associated with the same 
eternal nature as the immutable patriotism of the dead. In fact, we are told, racism – 
and, by implication, patriotism – are functions of class, operating to maintain internal 
domination by means of overseas expansion: 
 
It [colonial racism] did so by generalising a principle of innate, inherent superiority on 
which its own domestic position was (however shakily) based to the vastness of the 
overseas possessions, covertly (or not so covertly) conveying the idea that if, say, 
English lords were naturally superior to other Englishmen, no matter: these other 
Englishmen were no less superior to the subjected natives. (150) 
 
This was assisted by the opportunity colonialism presented for its bourgeois and petty 
bourgeois participants to live like lords. The quotation that Anderson uses to illustrate 
this point is strangely familiar: 
 
In Moulmein, in lower Burma [this obscure town needs explaining to readers in the 
metropole], I was hated by large numbers of people – the only time in my life that I 
have been important enough for this to happen to me. I was a sub-divisional police 
officer of the town. (151) 
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This is, of course, the opening of Orwell‟s “Shooting an Elephant”, which Anderson 
acknowledges with a footnote. However, in the main body of his text, Anderson does 
not mention Orwell and simply labels the extract “tropical Gothic”, presumably 
implying that it tells us more about English fantasy than Burmese reality. What 
Anderson fails to acknowledge is that “Shooting an Elephant” is an anti-imperialist 
text. To be sure, as John Coombes has noted, the allegory of imperialism it provides 
can be read on one level as carrying “a strong charge of right-wing pessimism and 
elegy” (Coombes 252). However, as Coombes goes on to demonstrate, Orwell‟s 
conscious manipulation of interplaying parodies works to expose not only the 
“fraudulence of imperialist performance” but also the “fraudulence of the 
performance of writing imperialism” (254). In other words, the reason why Anderson 
finds Orwell such a convenient medium for exposing the class-based operations of 
colonialism is that Orwell was himself intent on exposing those same operations by 
means of parodying them. In this context, Edward Said‟s Orientalism provides a more 
useful model for the postcolonial critic wishing to use Orwell to illustrate the colonial 
mindset. As part of his demonstration of how Orientalism was transformed from a 
specialist nineteenth-century discipline into one of the mainsprings of twentieth-
century European cultural consciousness, Said cites a passage from Orwell‟s essay 
“Marrakech” (1939): 
 
… when you see how the people live, and still more, how easily they die, it is always 
difficult to believe that you are walking among human beings. All colonial empires 
are in reality founded upon that fact. The people have brown faces – besides they have 
so many of them! Are they really the same flesh as yourself? Do they even have 
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names? Or are they merely a kind of undifferentiated brown stuff, about as individual 
as bees or coral insects? (252 [CW XI 417])  
 
This allows Said both to expose common forms of individual prejudice and to make 
the more general point that colonialism operated by allowing its subjects to be seen 
only „as a kind of continental emanation‟ (251). Thus, he is able to conclude: 
 
… the non-European known to Europeans is precisely what Orwell says about him. 
He is either a figure of fun, or an atom in a vast collectivity designated in ordinary or 
cultivated discourse as an undifferentiated type called Oriental, African, yellow, 
brown, or Muslim. (252) 
 
Said avoids implying that Orwell shares this colonial viewpoint by properly 
acknowledging him and quoting a passage sufficiently long to show that Orwell gives 
voice to such prejudices through an act of literary ventriloquism that is sharply 
differentiated from his normal narrative tone. Viewed in this light, Orwell‟s work is 
not only an illustrative tool but also, as this extract suggests, a forerunner of 
postcolonial theory in its conscious criticism of the dualism within Eurocentric 
universalism which enabled the Western visitor to view the East as simultaneously 
exotic spectacle and homogenous mass. Furthermore, Orwell carefully situated the 
origins of this dualism within European class society. For example, Anderson‟s point 
about colonialism permitting “sizeable numbers of bourgeois and petty bourgeois to 
play aristocrat off centre court” (150) was originally made by Orwell in The Road to 
Wigan Pier (1937):  
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To belong to [the upper-middle] class when you were at the £400 a year level was a 
queer business, for it meant that your gentility was almost purely theoretical. You 
lived, so to speak, at two levels simultaneously. Theoretically you knew all about 
servants and how to tip them, although in practice you had one or, at most, two 
resident servants. Theoretically you knew how to wear your clothes and how to order 
a dinner, although in practice you could never afford to go to a decent tailor or a 
decent restaurant. Theoretically you knew how to shoot and ride, although in practice 
you had no horses to ride and not an inch of ground to shoot over. It was this that 
explained the attraction of India (more recently Kenya, Nigeria, etc.) for the lower-
upper-middle class. The people who went there as soldiers and officials did not go 
there to make money, for a soldier or an official does not make money; they went 
there because in India, with cheap horses, free shooting, and hordes of black servants, 
it was so easy to play at being a gentleman. (CW V 115) 
 
   Orwell repeatedly emphasised these points precisely because they showed the link 
between the Empire and the domestic class system, and he consistently attacked both. 
It is also worth remembering that he considered colonialism to be a “far vaster 
injustice” than fascism (CW XI 360) and that this was one source of his criticism of 
simplistic anti-fascist or Popular-Front politics in the late 1930s. These factors have to 
be taken properly into account before any criticism can be made of his celebration of 
social patriotism and Englishness in The Lion and the Unicorn. In particular, it is 
necessary to consider his not inconsiderable theoretical writings on questions of 
patriotism and nationalism. 
   The position adopted by Orwell in the 1940 essay, “Notes on the Way”, clearly 
anticipates Anderson: “Racialism […] has nothing to do with nationalism”. However, 
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Orwell argues that rather than being the product of domestic feudalism, racialism is 
the source of that feudalism. Thus, English feudalism resulted from the Norman 
conquest of the Saxons: “There are traces of the Norman predominance in our 
language to this day. And it is much easier for the aristocrat to be ruthless if he 
imagines that the serf is different from himself in blood and bone” (CW XII 122). 
Against this, nationalism was – “up to a point” – perfectly understandable as a 
defence of conquered countries. This seems surprisingly different from Orwell‟s later 
trenchant views on nationalism expressed in the 1945 essay “Notes on Nationalism”: 
 
By “patriotism” I mean devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, 
which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force upon other 
people. Patriotism is of its nature defensive, both militarily and culturally. 
Nationalism, on the other hand, is inseparable from the desire for power. The abiding 
purpose of every nationalist is to secure more power and more prestige, not for 
himself but for the nation or other unit in which he has chosen to sink his own 
individuality. (CW XVII 142)  
 
It can be seen that what was described as nationalism in spring 1940 is regarded as 
patriotism in 1945, while the term nationalism has seemingly been applied to the 
totalitarian forms of consciousness that Orwell was to explore in Nineteen Eighty-
Four (1949). This leaves open the question of what Orwell meant by patriotism in 
1940. In the second half of “Notes on the Way”, Orwell is concerned with the 
inevitability of a collectivist form of society: “The only question is whether it is to be 
founded on willing co-operation or on the machine gun” (CW XII 125). His answer 
demonstrates his thinking at the time: 
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Men die in battle  not gladly, of course, but at any rate voluntarily  because of 
abstractions called “honour”, “duty”, “patriotism” and so forth. 
   All this really means is that they are aware of some organism greater than 
themselves, stretching into the future and the past, within which they feel themselves 
to be immortal. “Who dies if England live?” sounds like a piece of bombast, but if 
you alter “England” to whatever you prefer, you can see that it expresses one of the 
main motives of human conduct. People sacrifice themselves for the sake of 
fragmentary communities  nation, race, creed, class  and only become aware that 
they are not individuals in the very moment when they are facing bullets. A very 
slight increase in consciousness, and their sense of loyalty could be transferred to 
humanity itself, which is not an abstraction. (CW XII 125-6) 
 
As Orwell goes on to acknowledge indirectly, he has taken Marx‟s equation  
“Religion is the sigh of the soul in a soulless world. Religion is the opium of the 
people”  and substituted “patriotism” for “religion”. The implication is that 
“patriotism” has for Orwell the same dialectical sense that Marx gave to “religion”. 
This dialectical sense of patriotism can be seen to underpin The Lion and the Unicorn 
which incorporates a number of phrases directly from the earlier essay, for example: 
“[English Civilisation] is continuous, it stretches into the future and the past, there is 
something in it that persists, as in a living creature” (CW XII 393). However, by 1945 
Orwell had to accept that the English revolution proclaimed in The Lion and the 
Unicorn had not come to pass. In an article of that year, “The French Believe We 
Have Had a Revolution”, he was quick to identify the problem: “The mistake made, in 
many cases, seems to be to confuse patriotism with social enlightenment” (CW XVII 
 8 
94). Once again the opium of the people had proved stronger in the short term than 
the sigh of the soul in a soulless world. 
   It was this disappointment which led directly to the more restrictive definition of 
patriotism that we have seen Orwell to adopt in “Notes on Nationalism”. For while he 
appears to advocate patriotism – “It can plausibly be argued, for instance – it is even 
probably true – that patriotism is an inoculation against nationalism, that monarchy is 
a guard against dictatorship” – by the end of the essay he clearly designates and 
rejects this train of thought “as a species of Conservatism” (CW XVII 142). By the 
same token, his definition of “nationalism” is not as unrelentingly negative as it 
appears from the passage quoted earlier. Indeed, there the term “nationalism” appears 
to have become synonymous with the dominant Western post-war negative 
conception of nationalism against which Anderson‟s book was a timely reaction. 
However, as the essay progresses, Orwell admits that he is not using the word in its 
accepted sense but as an extended term to cover a variety of movements from 
Communism to Catholicism. In short, the dialectical sense that Orwell had applied to 
“patriotism” in 1940 had now been transferred to “nationalism” with the result that, 
despite the evident tone of distaste, he is actually arguing in “Notes on Nationalism” 
for a complex acceptance of nationalism: 
 
I think one must engage in politics – using the word in a wide sense – and that one 
must have preferences: that is, one must recognise that some causes are objectively 
better than others, even if they are advanced by equally bad means. As for the 
nationalistic loves and hatreds that I have spoken of, they are part of the make-up of 
most of us, whether we like it or not. Whether it is possible to get rid of them I do not 
know, but I do believe that it is possible to struggle against them, and that this is 
 9 
essentially a moral effort. It is a question first of all of discovering what one really is, 
what one own‟s feelings really are, and then of making allowance for the inevitable 
bias. If you hate and fear Russia, if you are jealous of the wealth and power of 
America, if you despise Jews, if you have a sentiment of inferiority towards the 
British ruling class, you cannot get rid of these feelings simply by taking thought. But 
you can at least recognise that you have them and prevent them from contaminating 
your mental processes. The emotional urges which are inescapable, and are perhaps 
even necessary to political action, should be able to exist side by side with an 
acceptance of reality. (CW XVII 155) 
  
   Orwell‟s rejection of his own potential polar division between patriotism and 
nationalism  into defensiveness and desire for domination  has implications for 
Anderson‟s distinction between a closed patriotism and an open nationalism. While 
such rigid categorisations can be used to generate illuminating analysis, they do not 
reflect the messy realities of the political world. The trajectory of Orwell‟s thought 
from 1940 to 1945 illuminates patriotism and nationalism as shifting aspects of a 
wider dialectical interplay between identification with imagined communities and 
loyalty to humanity. A crude Marxism  but not, of course, Marx himself  would 
attempt to separate these two into false consciousness and authenticity. Orwell did not 
fall into this trap and instead employed his dialectical understanding towards 
changing the world rather than merely theoretically describing it.  
   From this perspective on Orwell, the account of him provided by Rushdie in  
“Outside the Whale” is simply unrecognisable. Writing in 1984 about the spate of 
books and films set in the British Raj (notably Paul Scott‟s Raj Quartet and David 
Lean‟s film of A Passage to India), Rushdie connects the revival of colonial 
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stereotypes with Margaret Thatcher‟s post-Falklands declaration that „the British were 
still the people “who had ruled a quarter of the world”‟ (92). He then links this to 
“1984‟s other literary phenomenon, Mr Orwell” (93) – not in terms of a shared 
colonial viewpoint, but by claiming that there is a linked strand of pessimism and 
quietism running through Orwell‟s work from “Inside the Whale”, published in 1940, 
to Nineteen Eighty-Four published in 1949: “the truth is that passivity always serves 
the interests of the status quo, of the people already at the top of the heap, and the 
Orwell of “Inside the Whale” and Nineteen Eighty-Four is advocating ideas that can 
only be of service to our masters” (97). In rejecting passivity as directly enabling the 
British and American neo-colonial ventures of the 1980s, Rushdie makes a trenchant 
case for politically engaged writing: 
 
The modern world lacks not only hiding places, but certainties. There is no consensus 
about reality between, for example, the nations of the North and of the South. What 
President Reagan says is happening in Central America differs so radically from, say, 
the Sandinista version, that there is almost no common ground. It becomes necessary 
to take sides, to say whether or not one thinks of Nicaragua as the United States‟s 
“front yard”. (Vietnam, you will recall, was the “back yard”.) It seems to me 
imperative that literature enter such arguments, because what is being disputed is 
nothing less than what is the case, what is truth and what untruth. If writers leave the 
business of making pictures of the world to politicians, it will be one of history‟s great 
and most abject abdications. (100) 
 
I would suggest that this passage evokes no other twentieth-century writer so much as 
it does Orwell, who disputed truth and untruth with sufficient unflagging commitment 
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to leave probably the most rancorously disputed reception history of any major 
literary figure. Return to the first line of the passage from “Notes on Nationalism” 
quoted above and one finds it clearly stated: “I think one must engage in politics”. 
This was in 1945 and so in itself provides one point of contradiction to Rushdie‟s 
argument that Orwell was a quietist from 1940 onwards. However, given the 
persistence of distorted accounts of Orwell, it is useful to show by means of a close 
reading why Rushdie misreads Orwell in general and “Inside the Whale” in particular. 
   Rushdie‟s argument concerning “Inside the Whale” can be split into several points, 
which can be taken in turn. He criticises Orwell for attacking “the politically 
committed generation of Auden, Spender and MacNiece. “ „On the whole,‟ Orwell 
says, „the literary history of the thirties seems to justify the opinion that a writer does 
well to keep out of politics‟ ” (94). On this point, historical context is all important. 
The fact is that Auden renounced his political commitment before, or more correctly 
during, the writing of “Inside the Whale” and Orwell knew about this as is 
demonstrated by his comments: “Neither Auden nor, on the whole, Spender wrote 
about the Spanish war in quite the vein that was expected of them. Since then there 
has been a change of feeling and much dismay and confusion, because the actual 
course of events has made nonsense of the left-wing orthodoxy of the last few years” 
(CW XII 105). Immediately following this passage is the observation: “On the whole 
the literary history of the ‟thirties seems to justify the opinion that a writer does well 
to keep out of politics.” When not wrenched out of context, this can be seen for what 
it is: an ironic comment on the “change of feeling” undergone by the Auden group. It 
fact, it is almost certainly directed specifically at the opening lines of Auden‟s 
“September 1, 1939”, first published in America in New Republic in October 1939:  
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I sit in one of the dives 
On Fifty-Second Street 
Uncertain and afraid 
As the clever hopes expire 
Of a low dishonest decade (Auden 245) 
 
Hence, Orwell concludes this section of his discussion: “Good novels are not written 
by orthodoxy-sniffers, nor by people who are conscience-stricken about their own 
unorthodoxy. Good novels are written by people who are not frightened. This brings 
me back to Henry Miller” (CW XII 105-6). 
   This brings us to another of Rushdie‟s points of criticism, that he simply cannot see 
any value whatsoever in the work of Henry Miller, the subject of “Inside the Whale”: 
“In the forty-four years since the essay was first published, Miller‟s reputation has 
more or less completely evaporated, and he now looks to be little more than the happy 
pornographer beneath whose scatological surface Orwell saw such improbable 
depths” (95-6). The answer to this point is that Orwell advocates Miller because he 
wrote about everyday life and got closer to the ordinary man than more “purposive” 
writers: 
 
For the ordinary man is also passive. Within a narrow circle (home life, and perhaps 
the trade union and local politics) he feels himself master of his fate, but against major 
events he is as helpless as against the elements. So far from endeavouring to influence 
the future, he simply lies down and lets things happen to him. During the past ten 
years literature has involved itself more and more deeply in politics, with the result 
that there is now less room in it for the ordinary man than at any time during the past 
two centuries. (CW XII 91) 
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It is possible to speculate that, without the outbreak of war, the essay would have 
generated the voice of the ordinary man as pacifist – rather as in Orwell‟s novel 
Coming Up for Air. However, once having accepted the necessity of war, Orwell was 
no longer able to do this. But he kept his commitment to his own branch of 30s 
radicalism by insisting that the example of Miller was not the starting-point of a new 
school of literature, but “a demonstration of the impossibility of any major literature 
until the world has shaken itself into its new shape” (CW XII 112).  
   It is this particular assertion which Rushdie takes as conclusive proof of Orwell‟s 
apostasy, ironically commenting: “And we are told that fatalism is a quality of Indian 
thought” (95). However, the logic behind Orwell‟s seemingly straightforward claim is 
considerably more complex than Rushdie allows. A reading of Orwell‟s radio 
discussion of “The Proletarian Writer”, broadcast in December 1940, allows us to 
understand the apparent paradox. Here, Orwell argues, like Trotsky, “I don‟t believe 
the proletariat can create an independent literature while they are not the dominant 
class” (CW XII 295). However, he goes on to qualify this position:  
 
So long as the bourgeoisie are the dominant class, literature must be bourgeois. But I 
don‟t believe that they will be dominant much longer, or any other class either. I 
believe we are passing into a classless period, and what we call proletarian literature 
is one of the signs of change. (CW XII 297)  
 
Read back, this suggests that in “Inside the Whale”, Orwell was trying to argue not 
only that the voice of the ordinary man necessarily appeared passive because it was 
expressed against the active domination of the bourgeoisie, but also that the extent to 
which, nonetheless, Miller (and proletarian writers and Orwell himself) had been 
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successful in giving a voice to the ordinary man signified the waning of this bourgeois 
domination. From this perspective, ending on a note of the impossibility of major 
literature is not fatalistic, but optimistic. 
   Finally, Rushdie tells us that Orwell, who fully understands Miller‟s retreat inside 
the whale as a retreat inside the womb, “embraces and espouses this quietist 
philosophy” by encouraging us to “ „Get inside the whale  or rather, admit you are 
inside the whale (for you are of course)‟ ” (95). However, this injunction to “get 
inside the whale, accept it, endure it” is, I would suggest, ironic: “Seemingly there is 
nothing left but quietism” writes Orwell, “That seems to be the formula that any 
sensitive novelist is now likely to adopt” (emphasis added, CW XII 111). But it is not 
a single critical irony, rather a double irony that accepts the convention with no 
intention of actually abiding by it. Orwell had explicitly written in Coming Up for Air 
(1939) that “you can‟t put Jonah back in the whale” (CW VII 237). So he knew such a 
retreat was not possible, but by playing off Miller against the “Auden Generation”, 
which is what the essay is about, he was trying to create a dialectical space in which 
the politics of locality, human albeit passive, could interact with a wider political 
imaginary. Such a space is recognisable according to theoretical models of everyday 
life, in which the historical memory of class consciousness combines with the utopian 
promise of the future in order to contest the regulating processes of capitalist 
everydayness (see Roberts 16-29). 
   Perhaps the most significant aspect of these misreadings is their cumulative effect to 
the detriment of Rushdie‟s argument. For example, Aijaz Ahmad has praised 
Rushdie‟s “superb critique of Orwell” but despaired that even despite this Rushdie 
still seems to share a world-weary Orwellian view of history and politics (155-6). Yet 
what Rushdie really shares with Orwell is the same unorthodox mixture of journalistic 
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polemic and literary technique that generates a complexity of argument through levels 
of irony in the narrative tone rather than through the abstract theorizing more common 
in the academic world. By showing Rushdie to have misinterpreted Orwell, it is 
possible to redeem their shared approach by focusing on them not as writers standing 
alone against the totalitarian force of history, but as writers creating a dialectical space 
in their work – creating some sort of “whale” – and thus gaining purchase on an 
“unceasing storm” that has not yet become history. 
   The greater irony behind the shared failure of Anderson and Rushdie to appreciate 
the dialectical quality of Orwell‟s thought is that this quality originated in his colonial 
background  the factor that draws him into the postcolonial spotlight in the first 
place. As the passage from Wigan Pier quoted earlier demonstrates, the appeal to 
Orwell of joining the Imperial Police was that it reconciled the dual perspective 
resulting from being simultaneously poor and a gentleman. However, Orwell‟s 
account is perhaps disingenuous as it highlights the economic anomaly of his lower-
upper-middle class position rather than his romanticism and idealism, which were 
necessary ideological components of his youthful imperialist stance. This can be seen 
from his eventual inability in practice to maintain the schizophrenic illusion of Burma 
as simultaneously worthy of rule by gentlemen and a site of economic exploitation. It 
was the impossibility of maintaining his idealism under these circumstances that led 
to his rejection of imperialism and forced him to seek the dialectical resolution of his 
inherited dual perspective elsewhere  and where else but England? Orwell‟s colonial 
family background and his birth in India were factors which bred a shared idealistic 
belief in Empire and, above all, in the “home country”, England: a set of attitudes 
articulated in Kipling‟s notion of “who dies if England live?” which as we have seen 
remained central to Orwell‟s thought even in the revolutionary ferment of 1940. 
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   However, this is not to say that Orwell‟s work following his return from Burma 
simply reflects a transfer of allegiance from an idea of Empire to an idea of England. 
Rather we can see his initial evocation of ordinary England as the literary creation of 
an imaginary homeland: the formation of a dialectical space in which the nascent 
writer would be able to gain a purchase on the flux of history in general and the 
dynamic of imperialism in particular, as stated in Wigan Pier: “I felt that I had got to 
escape not merely from imperialism but from every form of man‟s dominion over 
man. I wanted to submerge myself right down among the oppressed, to be one of 
them and on their side against the tyrants” (CW V 138). Nevertheless, he knew 
perfectly well that he could not divorce himself from his class background: “in real 
life nobody ever does that kind of thing …” (CW V 140). But he could do it by 
writing under the very English pseudonym of “George Orwell” about being down and 
out. 
   The true significance of Orwell‟s career lies in the way he was able to transform this 
personal imaginary homeland into a political imagined community. The process 
begins at the end of Wigan Pier with the offering of his literary classless persona as a 
point of identification to a real middle-class readership with the injunction “we have 
nothing to lose but our aitches” (CW V 215). It reaches its culmination in The Lion 
and the Unicorn with its powerful projection of a classless England as a future worth 
fighting for: 
 
The place to look for the germs of the future England is in the light-industry areas and 
along the arterial roads. In Slough, Dagenham, Barnet, Letchworth, Hayes – 
everywhere, indeed, on the outskirts of great towns – the old pattern is gradually 
changing into something new. In those vast new wildernesses of glass and brick the 
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sharp distinctions of the older kind of town, with its slums and mansions, or of the 
country, with its manor-houses and squalid cottages, no longer exist. There are wide 
gradations of income, but it is the same kind of life that is being lived at different 
levels, in the labour-saving flats or Council houses, along the concrete roads and in 
the naked democracy of the swimming pools. (CW XII 408) 
 
   Another way of thinking about Orwell‟s history would be to see it as the outcome of 
somebody having to imagine a national identity for their “home” country because of 
neither belonging by birth nor being able to accept the economic and political ties that 
connected their birth places to that “home” country. As such, I would argue that this 
process is the reversal of that described by Anderson in which the idea of nationalism 
originated with the Creole populations of the Americas, who were not indigenous but 
wished to be no longer tied to the centres of Empire from which they had originated 
(47-65). The result of this reverse process undergone by Orwell was not the fixed 
Englishness of a narrow patriotism but the projection of an imagined community 
intended to transcend national self-interest in favour of a wider loyalty to humanity. 
The eradication of the domestic class system was to be linked to the eradication of 
racism and colonialism as suggested by the fourth item in the six-point programme 
advanced by Orwell in the third part of The Lion and the Unicorn: “Immediate 
Dominion status for India, with power to secede when the war is over” (CW XII 422). 
   Of course, the domestic realities of the 1945 settlement and the subsequent postwar 
British Welfare State turned out to be very different from Orwell‟s vision. But at a 
time when the ongoing „break-up‟ of Britain – as witnessed by both the devolution of 
power to the constituent nations and the accelerated erosion of the collective values 
embodied in the Welfare State – and the reemergence of „the English question‟ are 
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giving rise to anxieties concerning the future of cultural and ethnic diversity in 
England, it is useful to remember that there is a version of postcolonial Englishness 
ready to hand in Orwell‟s work. Perhaps, though, the wider significance of Orwell 
now lies in the way in which he can be read as a precursor to both Anderson and 
Rushdie and, more importantly, as the third participant in a discourse that links the 
literary writer‟s need for an imaginary homeland with the enduring political need for 
the self-sacrifice and openness of the imagined community as a staging point on the 
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